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OPEN-WORLD REGULATION: THE URGENT NEED FOR FEDERAL 
LEGISLATION ON VIDEO GAME LOOT BOXES 
 
Alex Reyes* 
   
 





Loot boxes are items in video games that contain randomized 
prizes that players can purchase with real-world money. In recent 
years, loot boxes have come under scrutiny because the 
relationship between behavior and the underlying mechanics of 
loot boxes are similar to that of addictive behaviors associated 
with real-world gambling. Many papers suggest solutions focused 
on industry changes without direct regulation. However, these 
papers neglect the enormous profit incentive to maintain a 
business practice which can have detrimental behavioral effects on 
children. The United States federal government must take example 
from a growing number of European countries and ban the sale of 
loot boxes to children. 
 Growing concern in the United States has been met with 
attempts to regulate loot boxes as gambling. However, the nature 
of loot boxes causes them to fall between the cracks in our present 
regulatory infrastructure, which is created through state gambling 
laws. Common law on what constitutes a prize typically requires 
that the item have transferrable value. Game developers restrict 
players from selling items gained through loot boxes, so this 
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requirement usually cannot be met through state gambling laws or 
common law. This paper will examine the Federal Government’s 
ability to regulate loot boxes on a national level and propose 
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In recent years, patterns of gambling behavior associated with 
video games have become a great concern to legislatures around 
the world.1 This paper will primarily focus on regulating loot box 
sales to children. As will be shown, children are one of the most 
vulnerable consumer groups when it comes to developing 
problematic gambling behaviors.  
In 2015, Grady Ballard initially only saw small transactions 
appear in his credit card statements.2 Grady was infuriated when he 
saw twenty-seven charges, which totaled $356.85.3 What he found 
out was that his son, Elijah Ballard, racked up these charges in 
order to get “skins,” which are custom designs for weapons, in the 
video game Counter-strike: Global Offensive. Elijah then used 
these skins to engage in a game of chance on a third-party website 
in the hopes of winning more valuable skins.4 This activity is a 
form of online gambling called skin-betting. What Grady did not 
know was that these charges were accrued after Elijah already sold 
his iPad in order to purchase two skins worth a combined $900.5 
Over time, Elijah was making larger and larger wagers on skin-
betting websites, so he needed more and more cash.6  
 
1 Kevin Webb, Regulators from More Than a Dozen Countries Are Looking to 
Crack Down on 'Loot Boxes, ' A Controversial Video Gaming Practice that 




%20have%20banned%20the%20practice. See also, Edwin Hong, Loot Boxes: 
Gambling for the Next Generation, 46 W. St. L. Rev. 61, 70-71 (2019) (In South 
Korea, some members of the National Assembly have proposed amendments to 
require that companies disclose the potential prizes and odds of winning. In 
China, the government created requirements that companies had to follow in 
order to sell loot boxes). 





5 Id.  
6 Id. 
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Researchers and regulators are becoming more and more 
concerned about loot boxes and the potential harms these virtual 
items pose to consumers. Researcher David Zendle defines loot 
boxes as “items in video games that may be bought for real-world 
money, but which provide players with a randomized reward of 
uncertain value.” 7 When players purchase a loot box, “players 
have no way of knowing whether it contains a rare and appealing 
item, or something else entirely.”8 Players can potentially spend 
large sums of money in their pursuit of rarer items. In 2016, Lance 
Perkins was stunned when he found $7,625 was charged from his 
17-year-old son’s Xbox Live account.9  Perkins gave “his son a 
credit card for emergencies or to make purchases for the family’s 
convenience store.”10 Instead, the 17-year-old used Perkins’s card 
to rack up charges on a game in the FIFA series.11 In FIFA, a 
player can purchase a loot box to obtain certain rare players.12 In 
2017, Roy Dobson from Lancashire, United Kingdom (“U.K.”), 
found out that his 11-year-old child spent around $7,465 on in-app 
purchases in just two weekends.13 The app Dobson’s son was using 
utilized in-game currency, a form of currency that the player buys 
with real-world money in order to pay for certain in-game items.14 
In 2018, a survey by the U.K. Gambling Commission showed that 
one underage gamer spent £1,000 a year, around $1,400, on FIFA 
 
7 David Zendle et al., The Prevalence of Loot Boxes in Mobile and Desktop 
Games,102 ADDICTION 1768, 1768 (2020). 
8 Id.  
9 Rob Thubron, Teenager Spends Almost $8,000 on Microtransactions Without 




11 Id.  
12 Matthew R. Yost, Video Game Gambling: Too Big a Bet for New Jersey, 70 
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 335, 343 (2017). 
13 Rob Thubron, 11-year-old Accidentally Spends Almost $7,500 on 
Microtransactions Using, Dad's Credit Card, TECHSPOT (Apr. 4, 2017, 2:15 
PM), https://www.techspot.com/news/68791-11-year-old-accidentally-spends-
almost-7500-microtransactions.html.  
14 David Zendle et al., Paying for Loot Boxes is Linked to Problem Gambling, 
Regardless of Specific Features Like Cash-Out and Pay-To-Win, 102 
COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 181, 183 (2020). 
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loot boxes to obtain better players for his team. 15 In 2019, a 
member of the public reported to the House of Commons’ Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport Committee that his adult son spent 
£50,000 in the British game Runescape.16 The Commission was 
shown a bank statement which showed that the son spent £247.93 
in one day, by making five separate transactions.17 Jagex, the 
company which runs Runescape, told the Commission that players 
could possibly spend up to “£1,000 [per] week or £5,000 [per 
month]”.18 Still, Jagex noted further, “only one player had hit that 
limit in the previous 12 months.19  
 While these cases may be outliers, video game companies 
rely on the income of these high-paying consumers—labeled 
“whales.”20 The term originated in the gambling industry to refer 
to “extremely wealthy, high roller patrons.”21 While 1.9% of all 
players spent money on mobile games, these “whales” made up 
90% of the $46.1 billion in total mobile game market revenue for 
2017.22 These accounts from players, coupled with growing 
revenues, began to concern international regulators who questioned 
whether loot boxes should be considered gambling. 
Newer releases of desktop games over the past several years 
 
15 Alex Hern & Rob Davies, Video Game Loot Boxes Should be Classed as 
Gambling, Says Commons, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2019, 1:01 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/games/2019/sep/12/video-game-loot-boxes-
should-be-classed-as-gambling-says-commons. 
16 DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, IMMERSIVE AND 
ADDICTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, 2017-2019, HC 1846, at ¶ 62 (U.K.). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at ¶ 63. 
19 Id. 
20 Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Habit-Forming Technology, 88 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 129, 140 (2019). Paul Tassi, Why It's Scary When 0.15% Mobile Gamers 
Bring In 50% of the Revenue, FORBES (Mar. 1, 2014, 4:28 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2014/03/01/why-its-scary-when-0-15-
mobile-gamers-bring-in-50-of-the-revenue/.  
21 Lisa Fletcher et al., Biggest Loser? Gambler Dropped $127M in a Year, ABC 
NEWS (Dec. 8, 2009, 3:18 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/gambler-
dropped-127-million-vegas-blames-casino-losses/story?id=9272730. 
22Andrei Klubnikin, Microtransactions in Games: The Good, the Bad, and the 
Ugly, GAMEANALYTICS (Feb. 14, 2018), 
https://gameanalytics.com/blog/microtransactions-games-good-bad-ugly.html.  
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have only increased the prevalence of loot boxes mechanics, as 
“young people have reported that playing games with loot boxes 
has led to addictive behavior….”23 Researchers note these 
mechanics are designed with human psychology in mind to 
encourage players to wager more and more of their money.24  
Recent research shows a relationship between loot boxes and 
gambling. 25 So, children who are exposed to video games with 
loot boxes may develop gambling habits later in life.26 The 
“emotional rush of loot boxes,” the growth of online celebrity 
endorsements, and gameplay mechanics which use stringent 
leveling systems and in-game currency, distort children’s 
valuations of these in-game items, creating an environment that 
coerces children to continue to purchase loot boxes.27 
This paper seeks to answer the question of whether the United 
States federal government has the authority to regulate loot boxes, 
and whether loot boxes should be regulated through existing state 
gambling laws or by federal statute.  
 Part I will examine the growing legal landscape regarding loot 
box regulation in the United States and abroad. Part II will analyze 
Congress’ authority to regulate loot boxes pursuant to its 
Commerce Clause powers28 and applicable limitations.29Part III 
will examine common law theories on gambling and the Unlawful 
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, to see how loot boxes may be 
outside the reach of these laws. Finally, Part IV will look at policy 
 
23 Matthew Busby, Loot Boxes Increasingly Common in Video Games Despite 





24 Zendle et al., supra note 14, at 182-83. 
25 Zendle et al., supra note 14, at 183. 
26 Id. 
27 Elpidio Cruz, Note, Tbe Psychological and Virtual Siege of Loot Boxes, 23 J. 
TECH. L. & POL'Y 215, 223-24 (2019). (The author uses the example of YouTube 
vlogger, Ninja, to demonstrate the possible influence a single celebrity may have 
over a significantly large audience, noting Ninja’s twenty-two million 
subscribers and his level of notoriety garnering a monthly income of $500,000). 
28 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 551 (2012). 
29 Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1482 (2018). 
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considerations taken from a current congressional bill on the 
subject of digital gambling and how the bill can help determine 
steps for future regulation.  
 
PART I: CURRENT RESPONSE TO LOOT BOXES AND 
MICROTRANSACTIONS 
 
A. Regulator Response: The Netherlands, Belgium, and the 
United Kingdom 
 Over the past few years, regulators from all over the world 
addressed or are addressing how loot boxes and other design 
elements of video games borrow elements from the gambling 
industry.30 For the purposes of this paper, we will first be exploring 
Europe’s response to loot boxes. The Netherlands and Belgium are 
examples of a strict legal approach to loot box regulation. These 
nations implemented, what are effectively, total bans on loot 
boxes, reasoning that they contravened their gambling laws.31 The 
U.K. provides an interesting case study as regulators were 
originally skeptical that loot boxes should be categorized as 
gambling. During the legislative process, representatives of the 
video game industry lobbied Parliament to show how loot boxes 
were dissimilar to gambling.32 However, the U.K. government was 
 
30 Kevin Webb, Regulators from More Than a Dozen Countries Are Looking to 
Crack Down on 'Loot Boxes, ' A Controversial Video Gaming Practice that 





31 David J. Castillo, Note, Unpacking the Loot Box: How Gaming’s Latest 
Monetization System Flirts with Traditional Gambling Methods, 59 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 165, 187 (2019); see also Edwin Hong, Loot Boxes: Gambling 
for the Next Generation, 46 W. ST. L. REV. 61, 73-74 (2019)(After the 
Netherlands Gaming Authority made their announcement developers Valve and 
Electronic Arts removed loot box features from their games in the Netherlands. 
After the Belgium Gambling Commission made their announcement of their 
regulations, Valve, Blizzard, and Electronic Arts removed loot boxes features 
from their games in Belgium.) 
32 Ana Diaz, EA Calls Its Loot Boxes ‘Surprise Mechanics,’ Says They’re Used 
Ethically, POLYGON, (Jun. 21, 2019, 9:10 AM), 
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not persuaded by the video game industry and in a 2019 report, 
which documented Parliament’s investigation into loot boxes, 
ultimately concluded that loot boxes contained an element of 
chance that made them unsuitable for sale to children, and should 
therefore be prohibited.33 The report cited new research on 
videogame design elements that showed a correlation between loot 
boxes and gambling behavior.34 
 
1. The Netherlands 
 
 In the Netherlands, regulators have adopted substantial 
regulations on loot boxes.35 In 2018, the Netherlands Gaming 
Authority released a report that revealed “four out of ten loot boxes 
violated the Betting and Gaming Act.”36 Those boxes violated the 
Act because the “prizes were determined by chance” and “the 
prizes could be traded outside of the game, thereby having market 
value.”37 The Gaming Authority also conducted a study which 
showed that all forms of loot boxes were addictive, despite finding 
only certain loot boxes as gambling.38 The Gaming Authority 
called on developers to remove “addiction-sensitive elements of 
loot boxes” including the “stunning visual effects, ability to open 
them in quick succession, and the ‘almost winning’ effects that 
tease at a jackpot.”39 For games in the Netherlands, developers 
such as Valve, immediately disabled the feature to open loot 
boxes.40 Electronic Arts (“EA”) eliminated loot boxes from its 




33 DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, IMMERSIVE AND 
ADDICTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 16 at 79. 
34 Id. at ¶ 80-85. 
35 Edwin Hong, Loot Boxes: Gambling for the Next Generation, 46 W. ST. L. 
REV. 61, 73 (2019). 
36 Id. 
37 Id.  
38 Id. at 74. 
39 Id. at 73. 
40 Id. 
2020  OPEN-WORLD REGULATION 95 
 
 
Authority’s findings.41 The Gaming Authority stated that it would 
take action against other developers that violated these laws, which 




 In Belgium, the Gambling Commission found that loot 
boxes violated the Belgian Gaming and Betting Act.43 The 
Commission looked at four elements to determine if loot boxes are 
gambling.44 The elements were: “if it is 1) a game, where 2) a bet 
is placed that leads to 3) loss or win by at least one player, and 4) 
chance serves as an element in the course of the game, indication 
of the winner, or determination of the size of winnings.”45 Opening 
loot boxes or starting a spinning wheel, requires active 
participation from the user, so these mechanics were considered a 
game.46 The Commission found that purchasing a loot box or in-
game currency constituted placing a bet.47 The loss or win element 
was satisfied when loot boxes provided the player an item that 
other players are precluded from obtaining.48  The use of a random 
number generator satisfied the chance element of the test.49 
 The Belgium Commission made several recommendations 
for future action including: “1) criminal prosecution for operators, 
2) specific permits developed for games of chance in video games, 
3) prohibitions on the purchase of games with paid loot boxes by 
minors, and 4) age verifications in markets.”50 After the 
Commission made these recommendations, members of the 
gaming industry quickly responded. Valve immediately disabled 




43 Id. at 75. 
44 Id. at 74. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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developer, stated that it would disable its loot boxes in its virtual 
card game Heroes of the Storm.52 EA refused to remove loot boxes 
from its FIFA series games, which resulted in a criminal 
investigation by the Brussels prosecutor’s office. 
 
3. The United Kingdom  
 
 In a 2017 inquiry, the U.K.’s Gambling Commission took 
the stance that loot boxes were not gambling because their in-game 
items were not capable of being cashed out in the real world.53 
However, the Gambling Commission has begun to shift its 
position.  
In 2018, the Gambling Commission found that thirty-one 
percent of young people, ages 11-16, claimed to “have paid money 
or used in-game items to open loot boxes to get other in-game 
items, within a computer or app-based game.”54  The Commission 
saw an increase in the number of respondents who were considered 
“at-risk” gamblers under the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders Fourth Edition’s (“DSM-IV”) problem gambling 
screen.55 The individuals “at-risk” for problem gambling rose from 
0.9% in 2017 to 1.7% in 2018.56  The Commission also saw an 
increase in the number of respondents who were considered 
“problem” gamblers under the DSM-IV’s criteria for problem 
gambling.57  
 A recent study in the U.K. by Dr. David Zendle has shown 
a correlation between loot boxes and problem gambling across a 
variety of age groups.58 There were two correlations that were 
found among the results: first, that “the more money gamers spent 
 
52 Id.  
53 Loot boxes within video games, GAMBLING COMMISSION, (Nov. 24, 2017), 
https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/news-action-and-statistics/News/loot-
boxes-within-video-games.  
54 GAMBLING COMMISSION, YOUNG PEOPLE & GAMBLING 2018, 2018, HC, at 6 
(U.K.) https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/pdf/survey-data/young-people-
and-gambling-2018-report.pdf. 
55 Id. (The acronym for the screen is the DSM-IV-MR-J). 
56 Id. at 32. 
57 Id. 
58 Zendle et. al., supra note 14, at 190. 
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on loot boxes, the more severe their problem gambling”59 and 
second, that “gamers who paid for loot boxes scored more than 
twice as high on measures of problem gambling than those who 
did not.”60  
Other factors that strengthened the relationship between loot 
box spending and problem gambling included “near misses” and 
the use of “in-game currency,” also known as “scrips” in the 
gambling industry.61 
Near-misses are a feature in different kinds of real-world 
gambling where the player is shown that they were close to 
winning a highly-valued prize but instead won a prize of lesser or 
no value.62 Research on gambling shows that near-misses “lead to 
cognitive distortions whereby the player believes they are more 
likely to win in the future” and the player is encouraged to 
continue playing.63 Real-world examples include slot machines, 
which show losing combinations that are close to those required to 
win large amounts.64 Near-miss mechanics are found in the video 
game Dota 2, where players are shown a spinning selection of 
rewards that disappear over time.65 Often, the player will receive a 
less valuable reward, however, some of the last rewards to 
disappear are extremely rare.66  
Scrips are a substitute for currency used in the gambling 
context to create valuation biases so players don’t have a reference 
for how much they are spending.67 This feature is commonly 
represented through casino chips.68  Past research shows that real-
 
59 Id. 
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 187-88. (Scrips are a substitute for real-world currency, and in the 
context of video games, act as a middleman between real world currency and in-
game currency. Near misses, in the context of loot boxes, are mechanic where 
players are shown a variety of rare items that players might have won by 
opening that loot box. Typically, this display implies that players have almost 
received these valuable items from opening the loot box.) 






68 Id.  
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world poker players’ tendencies to gamble are strengthened when 
they are using chips compared to when they are using cash.69 In 
Fire Emblem Heroes, players can use real-world currency to 
purchase a certain number of orbs for “the chance to randomly 
receive a new character.”70 Dr. Zendle’s study showed  that similar 
to a poker players’ tendency to spend more with chips, a gamer’s 
tendency to spend more on loot boxes was strengthened when 
using in-game currency albeit a much smaller magnitude.71 
Ultimately, the U.K. is moving toward national regulation of 
loot boxes. The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
(“Department”) conducted numerous oral investigations with 
members of relevant agencies, video game industry leaders, and 
researchers, studying loot boxes and their effects on players.72 A 
Department report outlined the potential “psychosocial and 
financial harms” to gamers through the use of “immersive 
technologies.”73  The Department defined “immersive 
technologies” as technologies that “ integrate virtual content with 
the physical environment thus ‘immersing’ the user in a simulated 
experience.”74 The Department identified that the mechanics 
behind these immersive technologies can cause serious harm to a 
minority of people who struggle to maintain control over their use 
of digital technology.75  In identifying the potential harms of these 
immersive the report looked into the links between game design 
mechanics and gambling, where loot boxes were one of the main 
mechanics investigated.76 
 
B. Loot Boxes – Mechanics and Lack of Uniformity in Rating  
 
 An issue the Department explored was why games with 
loot boxes were not rated as games that contained simulated 
 
69 Id.  
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 188.  
72 DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, IMMERSIVE AND 
ADDICTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 16. 
73 Id. at 3. 
74 Id. at 6. 
75 Id. at 3. 
76 Id.  
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gambling.77  They noted the Gambling Commission’s 2018 report, 
which reported that thirty-one percent of 11-16-year-old gamers 
had paid money for a loot box or used in-game items to open loot 
boxes.78 The Department also noted that a study from Dr. Zendle 
and Dr. Paul Cairns found a link between “the amount that gamers 
spend on loot boxes and their score on the Problem Gambling 
Severity Index (PGSI).”79 The Zendle and Cairns study consisted 
of 7,000 gamers and suggested “'the gambling-like features of loot 
boxes are specifically responsible for the observed relationship 
between problem gambling and spending on loot boxes,’ as other 
forms of microtransactions80 did not display such a strong link.”81 
Furthermore, the study found the same link was twice as strong 
among adolescents as it was in adults.82 When asked to speak on 
the matter, Dr. Zendle stated that while a causative relationship 
between loot boxes and problem gambling has not been 
established, individuals who are predisposed to gambling addiction 
can develop issues as they migrate from video game gambling 
mechanics in loot boxes to real-world casinos.83 
 The Department looked at older research to determine the 
basic gambling mechanics used to make video game gambling so 
addictive.84 Research from the early 20th century showed that the 
randomness throughout the mechanism created the gambling 
addiction.85 Random rewards are used as a reinforcement 
mechanism to keep a player engaged.86 A prime example of the 
randomness principle is a slot machine, where the player performs 
 
77 Id. at 21-22. 
78 Id. at 27; see also Hong, supra note 35, at 74. 
79 DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, IMMERSIVE AND 
ADDICTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 16.  
80 Id. at 24. (“[M]icrotransactions” - small payments that players make 
throughout the process of playing a game, for example to acquire in-game skills 
or items or to progress more quickly through levels). 
81 Id. at 29. 
82Id. at 29; see also Hong, supra note 35, at 75. 
83DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, IMMERSIVE AND 
ADDICTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 16 at 30. 
84 Id. at 42. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
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an action (pulls a lever), there is a delay (quick or long), then there 
is a reward (big or small). Video game developers use this 
principle to extend user involvement or get them to come back to 
the game.87 King, the developer of the game Candy Crush, uses 
this mechanism by providing the player with pop-ups at random 
intervals offering motivation or a “free spin” to win a power-up 
that enhances gameplay.88 Here, the player “pulls a lever” by 
playing the game, the delay in the pop-up is random, and the 
reward is random as well.89 Through this system, the player is 
rewarded for just using the app, incentivizing future use.90 
 Industry leaders were reluctant to discuss data on player 
engagement or acknowledge the active use of these psychological 
mechanics in their games.91 For example, Dr. Jo Twist, CEO of 
The Association for U.K. Interactive Entertainment (“UKIE”) 
argues that players have agency in the choice of games they play 
and how long they play them.92 Richard Wilson, the Chief 
Executive of The Independent Game Developers' Association 
(“TIGA”), a trade organization for the video game industry in 
Europe, acknowledged that there were players who played video 
games excessively.93 However, he also stated that government 
solutions required participation from representatives of the 
industry and should take conservative steps going forward.94 The 
Department found the lack of acknowledgement over the particular 
mechanics of the video games as well as the lack of transparency 
from developers “unacceptable.”95 
The Gambling Commission reported to the Department that it 
was concerned that the current Pan European Game Information 
(“PEGI”) ratings were not being enforced uniformly in regards to 
 
87 DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, IMMERSIVE AND 
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gambling mechanics in video games.96 One parent was concerned 
that a game called Bricky Farm was rated for 4 year olds when it 
contained a roulette style wheel which gave the player gems for 
further advancement in the game.97 The Gambling Commission 
agreed that “current age ratings were not in line with public 
expectation” as games containing gambling mechanics should not 
be allowed to children in the “4-plus” and “12-plus” PEGI 
ratings.98 The Department recommended the immediate 
establishment of a scientific working group to look at the effects of 
gambling-like mechanics in video games.99 
Dr. Zendle also raised concerns that current PEGI guidelines 
place warnings on games with simulated gambling, but not on 
games containing loot boxes.100 Dr. Zendle made 
recommendations to the Department to: (1) have PEGI create 
content descriptors and parental warnings for games with loot 
boxes, and (2) consider restricting games with loot boxes to people 
of legal gambling age.101 The head of the Gambling Commission 
agreed with Dr. Zendle and recommended that the U.K. 
government apply the same PEGI ratings for gambling games and 
age restrictions to games containing loot boxes.102  
 
C. Loot Boxes – Fitting them into the Legal Framework. 
 
 Another issue that the Department explored was how to fit 
loot boxes as gambling under the present legal framework in the 
U.K..103 The largest issues were: (1) valuation,104 and (2) 
determining if loot boxes are games of chance.105 The Department 
posed this question to Dr. Aaron Drummond and Dr. James Sauer, 
 
96 DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, IMMERSIVE AND 
ADDICTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 16 at 21. 
97 Id. at 26. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 27. 
100 Id. at 30. 
101 Id. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 31-34. 
104 Id. at 31. 
105 Id. at 33. 
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researchers looking into the psychological similarities between loot 
boxes and real-world gambling.106 They stated that the current 
definition of “value” was too narrow and did not represent the 
social value in the prizes won through loot boxes and the 
psychological power this value had to influence human 
behavior.107 Another form of valuation came from the presence of 
skin-betting websites.108 The Gambling Commission concluded 
that video game companies effectively act as a central bank to 
disseminate in-game items and that skin-betting provides 
continuous engagement with the game as players try to collect 
more skins.109 The Department agreed that the definition of value 
needed to be expanded to reflect the reality of people’s experiences 
in spending real-world money in video games.110  
 Furthermore, the Department decided that the business 
models of game developers created imbalances of information 
regarding the methods these games use to maximize users’ 
attention,111 which can incentivize players to interact with 
gambling mechanics in their games.112  An example of game 
development that encourages players to purchase loot boxes is 
“gaming telemetry,” which collects a player’s data in the 
background for use in analytics.” to help with flow.113 Some 
companies, such as EA, use this data for dynamic difficulty 
adjustment, where the difficulty of the video game may be 
automatically adjusted to keep the user engaged.114 In pay-to-win 
games with online multiplayer gameplay, difficulty adjustment will 
come in the form of pairing a lesser-skilled player with a more 
skilled player to incentivize the lesser-skilled player to engage in a 
 
106 DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, IMMERSIVE AND 
ADDICTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 16 at 31. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 33. (“‘[S]kin betting’ or ‘skin gambling’ is the use of virtual items 
acquired in a game as a method of payment for a stake in external, unlicensed 
gambling.)  
109 Id. at 34. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 35. 
112 Id. at 42. 
113 Id. at 36. 
114 Id. at 37.  
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microtransaction to gain a competitive advantage.115 In EA’s Star 
Wars Battlefront II, players could find “Star Cards” in loot boxes, 
which gave stat boosts and abilities to users’ characters.116 These 
loot boxes could be earned through gameplay or purchased.117 
However, many players found the gameplay method so difficult 
that the immediacy of receiving a loot box through a 
microtransaction seemed necessary to maintain “competitive 
balance” in online multiplayer battles.118 
 Video game companies were not clear with the Department 
as to how they used player information gained through 
telemetry.119 Epic Games, the company that owns Fortnite, refused 
to give the Department details on player engagement, despite 
giving players weekly reports on their playtimes.120 EA’s 
spokesperson gave a similar answer regarding gameplay 
information in FIFA, and refused to provide data on length of play, 
despite the fact that EA tracks this data.121 The Department 
declared that the companies were “willfully obtuse” about how 
they used this data.122  
 The Department not only looked at what video game 
companies put in their games to facilitate loot box spending, but 
also what they did not put to deter minors from loot box 
mechanics.123 Notably, the Department focused on the lack of “age 
estimation” algorithms.124 These algorithms collect data to 
compare against the age a user states in their player profile as a 
 
115 DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, IMMERSIVE AND 
ADDICTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 16 at 37; see also, Andrew V. Moshirnia, 
Precious and Worthless: A Comparative Perspective on Loot Boxes and 
Gambling, 20 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 77, 92 (2018).  
116 Andrew V. Moshirnia, Precious and Worthless: A Comparative Perspective 
on Loot Boxes and Gambling, 20 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 77, 92 (2018). 
117 Id. at 93. 
118 Id. at 93. 
119 DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, IMMERSIVE AND 
ADDICTIVE TECHNOLOGIES supra note 16, at 39. 
120Id. at 34. 
121 Id.  
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 41. 
124 Id. at 40 
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form of age verification.125 The Department viewed these lack of 
robust controls over underage gambling as companies not fully 
considering the adverse effects loot boxes had on users.126  
The aforementioned nations referenced in Part I are some of 
the first to approach the regulation of loot boxes through the lens 
of national gambling laws. The Netherlands and Belgium approach 
provides an analogue that can be applied to a federal regulatory 
scheme in the United States (“U.S.”).127 Currently, U.S. gambling 
is governed by both federal and state law.128 The way in which 
European countries define gambling and how they go about 
regulating loot boxes under these definitions helps to highlight the 
problems with regulating loot boxes under U.S. state gambling 
laws, which will be discussed below.  Ultimately, this paper will 
argue for a ban similar to the Netherlands and Belgium, but with a 
more constrained focus on restricting sales of loot boxes to 
children. However, at this moment, the U.S. is similar to the U.K. 
in that its appropriate regulatory agency, the Federal Trade 
Commission, is still investigating various sources and examining 
different solutions. The following section will look at the latest 
step that the U.S. federal government has taken to address the 
growing concern of loot boxes.  
 
D. The United States – Recent FTC Workshop  
 
 In 2018, Senator Maggie Hassan requested that the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) investigate loot boxes in video 
games.129 On November 27, 2018, the FTC Chairman agreed to 
Senator Hassan’s request.130 On February 22, 2019, the FTC stated 
it was holding a public workshop to gather perspectives from both 
the “gaming industry and consumer advocates.”131 
 
125 Id.  
126 Id. at 41. 
127 Hong, supra note 35, at 75. 
128 Yost, supra note 12, at 340. 
129 Colin Campbell, FTC Pledges Loot Crate Investigation (Update), POLYGON 
(Nov. 27, 2018, 7:41 PM), https://www.polygon.com/2018/11/27/18115365/ftc-
loot-crate-investigation-senator-hassan.  
130 Id.  
131 Makena Kelly, FTC to Hold a Public Workshop on Loot Box Concerns this 
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 On August 7, 2019, the FTC held a public workshop called 
“Inside the Game: Unlocking the Consumer Issues Surrounding 
Loot Boxes.”132 The event was divided up into three panels133. The 
first panel “explore[d] the role of loot boxes and other similar 
mechanics and the impact of monetization modes on end users.”134 
The second panel presented recent academic research on the role of 
loot boxes.135 The third panel discussed “self-regulatory initiatives 
and consumer education.”136 However, the subject matter and the 
solutions the panelists spoke on fell into a spectrum of federal 
intervention with industry self-regulation of loot boxes on one end 
and then full regulation on every aspect of microtransactions on the 
other.137  
 
E. Industry Self-Regulation  
 
 Sean Kane, a founding member of the Video Game Bar 
Association, suggested that the decision to make in-game 
purchases  and what content should be available to children, should 
be left to the end user, assuming the user is an adult.138 Kane gave 
a history of video games that detailed how as development costs 
went up, the companies needed ways of gaining revenue aside 
from just the retail price.139 Kane highlighted the “freemium” 
model as providing player diversity in the games available to them, 
since these games are free to download and play.140 While there 
may be items to purchase in these games, ultimately, player agency 
 
Year, THE VERGE (Feb. 22, 2019, 12:31 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/22/18236352/loot-box-video-game-ftc-
workshop-hassan-congress. 
132 FED. TRADE COMM’N, INSIDE THE GAME: UNLOCKING THE CONSUMER ISSUES 
SURROUNDING LOOT BOXES (2019), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/1511966/loot_boxes
_workshop_transcript.pdf. 
133 Id. at 2. 
134 Id. at 13. 
135 Id. at 112. 
136 Id. at 167.  
137 Id. at 236. 
138 Id. at 27. 
139 Id. at 26. 
140 Id. 
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governs whether they make the microtransaction.141 When Kane 
spoke of loot boxes, he stated that not all loot boxes have a random 
element as some loot boxes tell the player its contents.142 
 Similarly, Jeff Haynes, the Senior Editor at Common Sense 
Media, argued that parents and consumers should have the choice 
whether to buy games containing loot box and 
microtransactions.143 Haynes explored how certain kinds of loot 
boxes incentivize players to buy them because they provide 
upgrades that allow players to earn higher rewards.144 Haynes also 
noted the developer controls the odds and the payout of the 
items.145 Despite this, Haynes argued that ultimately the player has 
the autonomy to only purchase premium games that do not have 
loot boxes.146 
 Mike Warneke, Chief Counsel of Tech Policy at the 
Entertainment Software Association, the leading trade organization 
for video game developers, defended the elements in video games 
suspected of incentivizing gambling behaviors.147He described loot 
 
141 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 132. 
142 Id. at 23. 
143 Id. at 38. 
144 Id. at 30. The first category of loot box is the “cosmetic loot box.” These loot 
boxes feature items that customize the design of characters, their weapons, or in-
game expressions. The second category of loot box is the “mode specific” loot 
box. These types of loot boxes are tied to specific sections of the game and can 
be used to get better characters for multiplayer settings and provide a 
competitive advantage. Haynes states that these types of loot boxes are still 
largely optional because the player can earn the items during normal gameplay. 
However, he does note that some companies will make earning the items more 
difficult, so as to make it near impossible to earn certain power-ups without 
resorting to loot-boxes. Haynes gives the example of Star Wars Battlefront II, 
where the amount of time to get one power-up would take real-world days of 
consistent gameplay. The third category of loot box is the “pay-to-loot” model 
where the players are required to pay money to ultimately be successful. This 
mechanic is found in online card games like Hearthstone and Magic the 
Gathering, where only certain packs will reward high level cards. Shooters, such 
as Call of Duty: Black Ops, will make you pay for high-powered gear but the 
game then places the gear in “blackjack staches,” and so the player can only 
acquire that gear at random.  
145 Id. at 33. 
146 Id. at 38. 
147 Id. at 46-48. 
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boxes as a mechanism not consistent with gambling and in-game 
currency as not a form of scrip.148 Warneke compared loot boxes to 
baseball cards, arguing that both loot boxes and baseball cards 
contain an item the purchaser can generally predict, but the buyer 
does not know the specific item until they open it.149  
 Warneke’s generalization of in-game currency downplayed 
their use as scrips, and instead analogized the mechanism more to 
play money.150 He said publishers use this currency, instead of 
having the player pay cash directly, because (1) it is impractical to 
make the player have to go through the entire transaction process 
for every $1 transaction, and (2) to preserve narrative integrity in 
the game.151 Under Warneke’s theory, play money helps to 
facilitate transactions, while also maintaining the design of the 
game by disguising the money as a currency that fits within the 
setting.152  
 Patricia Vance, president of the Entertainment Software 
Rating Board (“ESRB”), spoke on current parental controls 
implemented for game labeling and system settings.153 Current 
labeling for physical copies, as of 2018, presents descriptors that 
indicate the ability for “in-game spending.”154 This label is 
required on any game that holds opportunities for the player to 
have the ability to “make a purchase using cash.”155 Parental 
settings within the platforms allow parents to control what parts of 
the video games children can access.156  Parents have the ability to 
“control in-game purchases or block them altogether.”157 Account 
holders can also be notified whenever a purchase is made.158  
 Vance argued against further government regulation, by 
asserting that disclosing in-game purchasing options and providing 
 
148 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 132. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 47. 
151 Id. 
152 Id.  
153 Id. at 168-79. 
154 Id. at 176. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 173. 
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parents with controls to these features were sufficient to stop 
children from purchasing loot boxes.159 The ESRB performed 
research and saw that parents were becoming more informed over 
time about loot boxes, and determined that active communication, 
not government regulation, was the key to informing parents so 
that they could make decisions.160 Vance assured the panel that 
parents could find information on how to implement controls on 
systems and navigate video games on the ESRB website.161 Vance 
also gave assurances that the ESRB would partner with retailers 
like GameStop to provide an insert with every physical purchase of 
a new console, that will remind parents to set parental controls on 
their accounts.162 However, it should be noted that free-to-play 
games aren’t sold at brick-and-mortar stores, so this plan may not 
be as effective as Vance assures.  
 Development costs are an important business concern as 
well, as costs have risen into the hundreds of millions for some 
games.163 Most costs come from growing marketing expenses. For 
example, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2, cost up to $50 million 
to produce but the “marketing expenses and the cost of producing 
and distributing discs” created a launch budget of $200 million.164 
However, the workshop focused on the need for balancing these 
concerns with the growing concern for the impact loot boxes have 
on children’s mental health.165 
 
F. Government Regulation  
 
 The researchers participating in the FTC workshop 
 
159 FED. TRADE COMM’N ,supra note 132 at 228-29. 
160 Id. at 175. 
161 Id. at 177. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 24. The top grossing games of 2018 had budgets over $200 million 
dollars. Red Dead Redemption 2 had a budget of $265 million; Call of Duty: 
Modern Warfare 2 had a budget of $250 million; and Star Wars: The Old 
Republic $200 million.  
164 Ben Fritz, Video Game Borrows Page from Hollywood Playbook, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES (Nov. 18, 2009, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2009-nov-18-fi-ct-duty18-story.html. 
165 Id. at 234. 
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commented on current studies regarding the effect of loot boxes on 
gamers,166 while consumer advocacy groups spoke on the need for 
federal regulation.167  
 The researchers at the panel presented data that suggested a 
link between loot box spending and negative effects on human 
behavior.168 Dr. Zendle, in particular, commented that the features 
of loot boxes “look[ed] so much like gambling.”169 Dr. Zendle also 
argued that problem gambling could be triggered by loot boxes as 
the gamer originally does not start spending much money, but then, 
over time, spends more and more money on loot boxes as their 
gambling problem becomes more severe.170 As the gamer becomes 
more conditioned to the formal gambling characteristics of loot 
boxes, this conditioning transfers over when the gamer encounters 
real-world gambling that shares these characteristics with loot 
boxes.171 Dr. Zendle also found that there was a link to problem 
gambling regardless of the type of loot box a game utilized.172 
However, he noted that further research was required to explore 
the correlation.173 Still, Dr. Zendle suggested that analogies to 
baseball cards were not appropriate because determining the safety 
of a device based on similarities to other objects would not 
adequately determine the safety of the technology at issue.174 
 
166 Id. at 112. 
167 Id. at 55, 179, 185. 
168 Id. at 112, 136, 148. 
169 Id. at 114. (Dr. Zendle compares loot to more emblematic forms of gambling, 
such as roulette wheel, through the general mechanics both systems rely on. 
“Both when you're playing on a roulette wheel or while you're opening a loot 
box, your wagering something that you have in your hand of value now on the 
uncertain hope of getting something of greater value later on.”). 
170 Id. at 115. 
171 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra, note 132.  
172 Id. at 123. (When comparing cosmetic and paid-to-win loot boxes, the study 
did not find a difference in the strength of the link between loot boxes and 
problem gambling.); see also, supra n. 31.  
173 Id.  
174 Id. at 122. (Dr. Zendle stated, “Say I run a cinema and I serve Coca-Cola to 
all my customers. Coca-Cola is a thick, black, viscous liquid, full of energy, and 
I sort of got a great deal of engine oil. And I said to you, I know what, I'm just 
going to swap out the Coca-Cola in people's cups with engine oil because it's 
similar in that it's also a thick, black, viscous liquid.”) 
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 Dr. Adam Elmachtoub stated that regulation should be 
aimed at monitoring a company’s listed probabilities for certain 
items.175 He first approaches this topic by defining loot boxes by 
their effect on consumer valuations.176 He divided loot boxes into 
two categories: unique boxes and traditional boxes.177 Unique 
boxes give an item randomly but will always allocate a new, 
unique item to the player.178 Traditional boxes will give an item 
randomly but the player can potentially receive duplicates.179 
Through economic analysis, he found that unique boxes benefitted 
the developer because they could charge a premium for rarer 
prizes.180 Traditional boxes benefitted the consumer because the 
possibility of duplicate items necessitates a lower price point.181 
Dr. Elamchtoub argues that the traditional loot box system should 
be preferred since a player can buy the same number of loot boxes 
as unique loot boxes, but pay less money in the long-run.182 The 
seller retains some value because the rare item is still available to 
sell in another box.183 In order to keep the traditional loot box 
relatively fair, sellers should set the probabilities uniformly at 
random.184 However, companies can make more money by lying 
about these probabilities.185 Dr. Elamchtoub recommends that 
regulation would be needed to monitor developers to ensure 
probabilities are not changed and to protect consumers from 
potentially paying more money than they usually would.186  
 Representatives from NGOs specializing in consumer 
protection spoke out as proponents for regulation of loot boxes.187  
 
175 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra, note 132 at 139-140. 
176 Id. at 139. 
177 Id. at 140. 
178 Id. at 139.  
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John Breyault, Vice President of the National Consumers League, 
argued that the informational asymmetry greatly affects younger 
players who are not as capable of apprising the “value proposition 
of these [industry] schemes.”188 Breyault explained that research 
from Dr. Zendle found that adolescents were twice as likely to 
show measurements of problem gambling than adults under similar 
circumstances.189 Players can also be confused by the exchange 
rates of money as more video games incorporate in-game 
currencies.190 Price tags on items can read “$1.99” which can 
mislead a player from the practical price of “$2,” and so the player 
will more likely spend money on the item.191 Bonuses piled on top 
of their purchases can make young players lose sight of the item’s 
value.192 Breyault also found fault with the baseball card analogy, 
as baseball cards have fixed odds because they are physically 
produced for sets.193 Loot boxes are different because their odds 
can be manipulated based on greater amounts of information given 
by the player.194  
 Anna Laitin, director of financial policy for Consumer 
Reports, spoke on how the ESRB label for in-game purchases 
addressed quite a huge range of microtransactions, lacking detail in 
what type of purchases are included with the game.195 The label 
can range from buying a new character, all the way to surprise loot 
boxes.196 Despite mobile games containing more detailed 
information sections, the labels shown at the front contain the 
 
188 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra, note 132 at 61. (These monetization schemes 
are often enabled by information asymmetry between the players and the 
industry regarding things like game related preferences, how much money a 
consumer may have spent in the past, their spending habits). 
189 Id. at 62. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 63. 
192 Id.  
193 Id. at 66. 
194 Id. (Breyault asked two questions. “If that is indeed the case, what factors are 
being used to influence loot box drop odds? Is it things like data on how players 
are playing the game, how many available funds they may have in their account, 
whether they've purchased things in the past?”). 
195 Id. at 182. 
196 Id. at 182. 
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broad label of “in-app purchases.”197 
 Laitin also spoke on “dark patterns,” which she defined as 
“[t]actics to nudge consumer[s] [toward] taking actions.”198 
“Grinding” is a game design feature that has been adapted to make 
players do pointless work over a long period of time to make loot 
boxes seem like a less costly alternative.199 Daily bonuses 
incentivize people to keep playing every day.200 Pay-to-win 
features allow a gamer to play the game, but performance is 
hindered in competitive play if they do not spend money on items 
to help with gameplay.201 
 Keith Whyte, executive director of the National Council on 
Problem Gambling, went further and advocated for the 
establishment of a regulatory framework around loot boxes.202 The 
National Council on Problem Gambling is neutral in its stance on 
legalized gambling, with decades of experience and partnerships 
with the “government, gaming industry, counselors, regulators, 
researchers, and recovering gamblers.”203 Whyte noted that most 
published studies on the connection between loot boxes and 
gambling have “found an association” between the two.204 Whyte 
further stated, “protection features must be put in place to protect 
vulnerable players from developing gambling problems.”205 
Known populations susceptible to gambling problems include 
“males, youth, and…veterans.”206 Therefore, he argued that 
regulatory framework for loot boxes should be modeled off 
frameworks regulating the gambling industry.207 
 One recommendation Whyte gave as a remedy was to 
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199 Id. at 183. (Laitin described “grinding” as a process in video games where for 
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improve information transparency.208 The video game industry 
should create ways to incentivize a player’s “pro-social behavior,” 
such as figuring out the odds in a game.209 Incentivization is an 
opportunity for the video game industry to improve further than the 
gambling industry by displaying the odds in a more understandable 
way than complex play tables for slot machines.210  
 Another recommendation was to raise the ESRB rating for 
games with loot boxes to users of a higher age than those in the 
“Teen” rating.211 Whyte noted that in the gambling industry, there 
are discussions about consumer education protection, so it follows 
that with loot boxes, ratings should properly reflect the content in 
video games.212 Whyte notes that if a parent based their parental 
controls on the ESRB rating, and this rating is artificially low, then 
“that might not trigger the appropriate level of parental 
controls.”213 
Keith Whyte further argued that third-party objective 
regulation is necessary as a consumer protection feature to ensure 
that video game developers are held accountable to the odds stated 
to their players.214 Whyte noted that members of the gambling 
industry would not trust slot machine manufacturers to self-certify 
“the odds and randomness of their machines.”215  
Another suggestion to limit harm to players is to allow 
gamblers to self-exclude by limiting payments from the gamer.216 
This system can be effective since the gambling occurs in an 
environment where transactions are monitored.217 Third-party 
 
208 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra, note 132 at 189-90. 
209 Id. at 189. 
210 Id.at 190. 
211 Id., see also ESRB Ratings Guide, ENTERTAINMENT SOFTWARE RATING 
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regulators would need information from developers to determine if 
these systems are in place.218 Whyte also suggests companies 
should publicly disclose their information on player participation 
and loot box spending.219   
 Much of these panelists’ concerns of the effects loot boxes 
have on children are rooted in how much video game companies 
rely on loot boxes to make massive profits.220 Developer EA 
received thirty-one percent of its net bookings over the past three 
years just from microtransactions.221 The EA game Star Wars 
Battlefront II, made approximately $2.8 billion from 
microtransactions alone in 2019.222 In EA’s last quarter for 2019, 
the company made $993 million in microtransactions.223 Take-Two 
Interactive, parent company to Rockstar and 2K Games, made 
$857.8 million in “recurrent consumer spending” for the three-
month period ending in September 30, 2019.224 Recurrent 
consumer spending is defined  by “all manner of ‘ongoing 
consumer engagement’” including “virtual currency, add-on 
content, and in-game purchases.”225 Such spending was thirty-
seven percent of Take-Two Interactive’s total revenue during the 
three-month period ending in September 30, 2019.226 This trend 
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does not look like it is stopping either; as John Breyault noted in 
the panel, “[T]otal spending on loot boxes and skin gambling is 
forecast to go up to $50 billion by 2022, and that's nearly doubling 
since last year.”227 While this paper does not examine whether 
companies purposefully target loot boxes towards children, their 
reliance on loot boxes to make a profit despite children engaging 
with these mechanics, draws concern as to whether video game 
companies are trying hard enough to protect child consumers.  
Ultimately, these panelists overwhelmingly pointed out the 
need for regulation in regard to the sales of loot boxes to 
children.228 Highlighted in an FTC report on the presentation, 
“several of the panelists and comments to the public docket . . . 
[noted] . . . that kids are vulnerable to manipulation and social 
pressure, or may not fully understand the costs of the 
transaction.”229 Even with assurances from the industry of 
protections such as the “ESRB’s current rating system, disclosures, 
and parental controls, some panelists and commenters questioned 
whether the current protections were sufficient.”230 As Dr. Domoff 
noted, parental interaction with children is very limited when it 
comes to how they monitor children’s social media use.231 This 
lack of supervision likely extends to loot box purchases, so without 
adequate parental interaction, the risk of harm spreads to a larger 
number of children. While the report noted that the panelists came 
to a diverse set of conclusions, the FTC noted some panelists 
asserted that “the industry has not policed this area well and 
government regulation will mitigate the risk that industry 
economic motivations could result in consumer exploitation.”232 
This position falls in line with the growing concern within Europe, 
which has shifted to directly regulating loot boxes at a national 
level.233 This growing concern for the potential harms to children’s 
 
227 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra, note 132, at 58. 
228 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC VIDEO GAME LOOT BOX WORKSHOP: STAFF 
PERSPECTIVE 3 (2020). 
229 Id. 
230 Id. 
231 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra, note 132, at 149-50. 
232 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra, note 132, at 6. 
233 Haydn Taylor, Loot Boxes Should be a Consumer Protection Matter Not a 
Gambling One, Says EU Report, GAMESINDUSTRY.BIZ, Jul. 27, 2020, 
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psychology, ease for children to purchase these products, and the 
wide, interstate reach of the online market necessitates setting the 
United States’ gaze on federally regulating loot boxes. The 
question is now, how should the United States accomplish this? 
 
PART II: ANTI-COMMANDEERING AND THE COMMERCE POWER   
 
As regulatory efforts pick up steam in the United States, this 
paper examines the extent of the federal government’s regulatory 
authority over gambling and microtransactions as an economic 
activity. In the context of loot boxes and similar mechanics as a 
form of gambling, the following section will examine Murphy v. 
NCAA, the latest Supreme Court case on the subject of 
gambling.234 Since Murphy’s holding gave states more authority to 
govern sports gambling, it is necessary to understand the possible 
limits that the anti-commandeering doctrine may place on the 
federal government regarding the regulation of loot boxes as a 
form of gambling.235  
The subsequent sections will examine Congress’ power over 
interstate commerce to demonstrate the power the federal 
government will likely use to regulate microtransactions and loot 
boxes.  
  
A. Murphy v. NCAA – Anti-Commandeering and the States 
 
One step in understanding limits to the federal government’s 
ability to regulate loot boxes and their application to the states is to 
examine Murphy, where the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the 
federal government can only regulate individuals, not the states.236 
The facts in Murphy were as follows. In 1992, Congress passed the 
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”), 
which made it unlawful for a state “to sponsor, operate, advertise, 
 
https://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2020-07-27-loot-boxes-should-be-a-
consumer-protection-matter-not-gambling-says-eu-report; see also, Diaz, supra, 
note 32; Hong, supra, note 35, at 75. 
234 Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1482 (2018). 
235 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1482. 
236 Id. at 1476. 
2020  OPEN-WORLD REGULATION 117 
 
 
promote, license, or authorize by law or compact…. a lottery, 
sweepstakes, or other betting gambling, or wagering scheme 
based… on competitive sporting events.”237 PASPA allowed the 
United States Attorney General and sports organizations to file suit 
in federal court against states that violated the Act.238 In Murphy, 
the New Jersey Legislature enacted a statute that authorized sports 
gambling within the state,239 repealing state provisions that 
prohibited sports gambling schemes.240 The National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (“NCAA”) brought an action against the New 
Jersey Governor and other state officials, seeking to enjoin the law 
as the NCAA argued that the law violated PASPA.241 New Jersey 
responded by arguing that PASPA unconstitutionally infringed on 
the State’s sovereign authority and implicated the anti-
commandeering doctrine.242 
The Supreme Court held that the PASPA provision, which 
prohibited state authorization of sports gambling, violated the anti-
commandeering doctrine.243 Justice Alito wrote that the anti-
commandeering doctrine “withholds from Congress the power to 
issue orders directly to the States.”244 The Court looked to New 
York v. United States, where the federal government passed a law 
that required states to “take title” to low-level radioactive waste or 
to “regulate according to the instructions of Congress.”245 The 
Court in that case held the scheme unconstitutional. Justice 
O’Connor noted that the Constitution “confers upon Congress the 
power to regulate individuals, not States.”246 Further, the New York 
 
237 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1470; See 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1). 
238 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1470-71. 
239 Id. at 1471.  
240 Id. at 1465. 
241 Id. at 1471.  
242 Id. at 1470-71. (“The anticommandeering doctrine may sound arcane, but it is 
simply the expression of a fundamental structural decision incorporated into the 
Constitution, i.e., the decision to withhold from Congress the power to issue 
orders directly to the States.”). 
243 Id. at 1478.  
244 Id. at 1475. 
245 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
112, 144 (1992). 
246 Murphy, 138 S. Ct.at 1476.  See also New York, 505 U.S. at 144.  
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Court noted that Congress has the power to “pass laws requiring or 
prohibiting certain acts,” but lacks the power to compel the States 
to require or prohibit those acts.247 The law violated the anti-
commandeering doctrine because it directed the States to become 
agents of Congress and the federal government by forcing the 
States to “take title.”248  
In Murphy, the Court held that when a state “completely or 
partially repeals” old laws that ban sports gambling, then the state 
is “authorizing that activity.”249 The New Jersey statute repealing 
the state ban on sports gambling “permitt[ed]” and “authoriz[ed]” 
sports betting.250 This authorization violated the provision in 
PASPA, but the Court found that the PASPA provision violated 
the anti-commandeering doctrine.251  
However, the anti-commandeering doctrine does allow for the 
federal government to govern private actors directly, just not state 
legislatures.252 The Court in Murphy elaborated on several cases 
that illustrated federal schemes that governed private actors but did 
not impose on state sovereignty.253  
 
247 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476-77. See also New York, 505 U.S. at 166. 
248 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477. See also New York, 505 U.S. at 178.(“Where a 
federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress to legislate, it must do so 
directly; it may not conscript state governments as its agents.”). 
249 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1474.  
250 Id.  
251 Id. at 1478. 
252 Id. at 1476-77. 
253 Id. at 1476-78. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) ( In South 
Carolina v. Baker, the Court held that a federal statute requiring states to issue 
registered bonds, punishable by denying federal tax exemptions to state and 
local bonds, did not violate the anti-commandeering doctrine. The statute only 
required the state to conform to a federal standard that applied to the federal 
government and private corporations. The statute did not make the state enact 
the law for the federal government, but rather used the exemptions as an 
incentive.); see Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 146 (2000) (In Reno v. Condon, 
the Court held that a federal statute preventing state motor vehicle departments 
(DMVs) from disclosing personal information on record did not violate the anti-
commandeering doctrine. The statute applied to both state and private persons 
that obtained information from a DMV.  Similar to Baker, the federal statute 
“regulated state activities” rather than sought “to control or influence the manner 
in which States regulate private parties.”); see Hodel v. VA Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (In Hodel v. VA Surface Mining & 
 





B. Murphy Establishes that Federal Regulation of Video Game 
Gambling May Not Violate the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine  
  
In accordance with Murphy, the federal government would not 
have trouble enforcing a regulatory regime over gambling 
mechanics in video game content, even if a state already made 
gambling regulations against these mechanics in video games as 
Congress can regulate the video developers directly.254  
Speaking more to the necessity for federal regulation, no state 
has successfully passed state legislation to regulate loot boxes or 
gambling mechanics. 255 States have tried and failed to pass any 
laws on loot boxes in the context of state gambling, the federal 
government has more of a reason to regulate freely without 
conflicting with anti-commandeering principles. In Murphy, New 
Jersey already had a state law that prohibited sports gambling, so 
when the New Jersey legislature repealed the restriction on sports 
gambling, PASPA’s ban compelled state action to align itself with 
 
Reclamation Association, the Court held that the federal statute establishing a 
regulatory regime over surface coal mining operations, premised on 
“cooperative federalism”, did not violate the anti-commandeering doctrine. The 
federal statute required that the States adopt a permanent program to regulate 
surface level coal mining, and if a state failed to submit a program, the federal 
government would implement a federal program in the state.  This regulatory 
scheme did not violate the anti-commandeering doctrine because the federal 
government “allowed”, but did not “require” the States to participate in the 
program.) 
254 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476. 
255 Hong, supra note 35, at 77-79. (In Hawaii, Congressman Chris Lee tried to 
get two bills passed through the Hawaii House of Representatives. The House 
Bill failed and the Senate Bill is unrecognizable to the House Bill. In 
Washington, Senator Kevin Ranker introduced Senate Bill 6266, which would 
instruct the Washington Gambling Commission to “investigate the use of loot 
boxes and similar mechanisms.” The bill, indefinitely postponed since February 
of 2018, currently sits in the Washington Senate Committee on Rules. In 
Minnesota, Representative Rick Hansen introduced House Bill 4460, which 
would prohibit sales of video games containing loot boxes to a person under the 
age of 18. As of writing this paper this bill is still in the House Committee on 
Commerce and Regulatory Reform. 
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the federal law.256 Since no state statutes currently exist on loot 
boxes, the federal government can take regulatory action toward 
loot boxes and other gambling mechanics in video games under the 
Commerce Clause, mentioned later on, without potentially 
violating the anti-commandeering doctrine.257 
Marc Edelman, a professor of law at the Zicklin School of 
Business, wrote that the Supreme Court allowed the states an 
“opportunity to introduce their own sports-gambling laws based on 
their own independent policy.”258 After Murphy, Delaware, New 
Jersey, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Rhode 
Island passed laws legalizing casino-style gambling.259 While 
Congress cannot compel the States to take State action to 
accomplish federal goals on gambling, if the federal government 
does not choose to regulate, then the States are free to regulate 
gambling for their own citizens.260  
 It is still unclear what outcomes could occur if a state 
decides to pass its own laws to regulate loot box activity. As 
explained in Murphy, the federal government cannot restrict State 
legislatures from exercising their sovereign authority to regulate 
gambling within their borders.261 However, one way the federal 
government could still regulate loot boxes and other gambling 
mechanics within video games is by directly targeting video game 
developers and the Entertainment Software Association (“ESA”). 
As we will discuss soon, private actors engaged in an economic 
activity can be regulated through Congressional legislation under 
the Commerce Clause.262   
 
C. The Commerce Power: National Federation of Independent 
Businesses v. Sebelius 
 
 
256 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1465. 
257 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 551 (2012). 
258 Marc Edelman, Developments: Regulating Sports Gambling in the Aftermath 
of Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 26 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 
313, 339 (2018).  
259 Id. at 325.  
260 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484-85. 
261 Id.  
262 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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Congress can regulate existing, interstate economic activity 
through the Commerce Clause.263 Microtransactions are the mode 
by which players purchase virtual items such as loot boxes and 
other downloadable content.264  With the rise of online gaming, 
gamers can make microtransactions on their device anywhere in 
the United States.265 Microtransaction regulation would fall under 
the Commerce Clause as an economic activity266 or an activity 
when aggregated with other activities, affects commerce.267   
 In 2018, the video game industry made total revenue 
exceeding $43 billion.268 The nature of this economic activity is 
predominantly interstate, with digital format sales consisting of 
eighty-three percent of the content revenue made throughout the 
industry.269 Additionally, the video game industry self-regulates 
when it comes to microtransactions and the nature of their 
products.270 For example, the ESA is the leading representative of 
the video game industry, representing the industry in matters such 
as free speech271 and government attempts to link video games 
with gun violence.272 The interstate nature of digital sales and the 
 
263 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 551 (2012); U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
264 Brian Crecente, What are DLC, Loot Boxes and Microtransactions? An 
Explainer, VARIETY (Nov. 28, 2017, 8:28 AM), 
https://variety.com/2017/gaming/features/what-is-a-loot-box-1203047991/.  
265 The Unstoppable Rise of Online Gaming, ON: YORKSHIRRE MAGAZINE, 
https://www.on-magazine.co.uk/stuff/tech/the-unstoppable-rise-of-online-
gaming/. 
266 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 551 (2012). 
267 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942). 
268 ESA, ENTM’T. SOFTWARE ASS’N, 2019 Essential Facts About the Computer 




270 PROMARKET, Self-Regulation and the Video Game Industry: A New Stigler 
Center Case Study (Apr. 10, 2019). https://promarket.org/2019/04/10/self-
regulation-and-the-video-game-industry-a-new-stigler-center-case-study/. 
271 Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
272 Alex Gangitano, Video Game Group Pushes Back on Blaming Industry for 
Shootings, THE HILL, (Aug. 6, 2019), https://thehill.com/business-a-
lobbying/456326-video-game-group-pushes-back-on-blaming-industry-for-
shootings.  
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absence of state regulation allows the federal government to 
regulate loot boxes through the Commerce Clause. 
 In National Federation of Independent Businesses v. 
Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that Congress’ commerce 
power is expansive, but limited to “activity.”273 The Court 
examined the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act, 
which compelled individuals to buy health insurance or receive a 
penalty filed with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).274 
Congress has the power to regulate commerce, but Congress 
cannot compel commerce by requiring people purchase a 
product.275 The Court found that the individual mandate compelled 
individuals into the healthcare market by purchasing health 
insurance, essentially regulating their inactivity as opposed to their 
activity in commerce.276 Justice Roberts wrote that inactivity is 
“divorced from any link to an existing commercial activity.”277 
Thus, the power to regulate requires regulation of an existing 
commercial activity.278 
 Congress’ authority to regulate existing commercial 
activity still has an “expansive” reach over almost every product or 
action in commerce.279 Congress’ authority even extends past 
interstate commerce into activities that “have a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce.”280 Congress’ authority to regulate extends 
even further to activities that affect commerce, when those 
activities aggregate with similar activities that affect commerce.281 
 Microtransactions would be considered an activity in 
interstate commerce, since the transaction can take place from any 
state using an online service.282 One example is Xbox Live, the 
 
273 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 551 (2012). 
274 Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 539–40. 
275 Id. at 552. 
276 Id. at 548. 
277 Id. at 556. 
278 Id. at 550.  
279 Id. at 536. 
280 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 67 U.S. 519, 549 (quoting United 
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118–19 (1941)).  
281 Id. at 549 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942)). 
282 The Unstoppable Rise of Online Gaming, ON: YORKSHIRRE MAGAZINE, 
https://www.on-magazine.co.uk/stuff/tech/the-unstoppable-rise-of-online-
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online service for the Xbox console. Xbox Live provides the player 
with an account that is connected to a credit card so that players 
can conduct microtransactions within Xbox games.283 These 
functions are performed through the Microsoft Store, a 
marketplace for games and in-game content.284 Therefore, 
Congress would have an existing commercial activity to regulate, 
as console developers and other third-parties use online services to 
act as markets for players to purchase loot boxes, virtual currency, 
and other downloadable content from every state.  
   
 
PART III: GAMBLING AND FEDERAL STATUTES 
 
  Next is an examination on the common law rules of 
gambling and current federal statutes that tackle gambling. The 
elements of the common law rules show how the courts may 
examine claims regarding the video game industry’s business 
practices toward microtransactions.285  Recall that gamers’ 
valuations of the contents in loot boxes was a key topic in the 
debate amongst the FTC panelists when discussing whether loot 
boxes were considered gambling.286 In exploring how these 
concerns match current common law rules and the federal law, we 
ultimately find that these rules are inadequate for addressing the 
 
gaming/. (The transaction can be anywhere where the player uses a device to 
enter into a microtransaction.) 
283 XBOX, https://www.xbox.com/en-US/microsoft-store (last visited Apr. 13, 
2020). 
284 Id. 
285 See Kater v. Churchill Downs Inc., 886 F.3d 784, 789 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(valuation of virtual currency in video games); Liston v. King.com, Ltd., 254 F. 
Supp. 3d 989, 993 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (in-game items had value, where loss of that 
value amounted to a harm sufficient for standing).  
286 FED. TRADE COMM’N, INSIDE THE GAME: UNLOCKING THE CONSUMER ISSUES 
SURROUNDING LOOT BOXES (2020).(Mike Warneke comparing loot boxes to 
baseball cards and scrips as one-to-one transactions; John Breyault stating that 
price tags may not reflect the actual value the players are paying; Dr. 
Elmachtoub stating that probabilities need regulation so players can get the 
economic value out of traditional loot boxes; Anna Laitin, describing how 
grinding as a design feature is built to make players value loot boxes as a low 
cost alternative.) 
124 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 16:1 
  
concerns for loot boxes.  
 
A. Elements of Gambling 
 
In most of the United States, gambling is generally defined as 
“an event where someone risks something of value in the hopes of 
winning a valuable prize based on the outcome of an uncertain 
event.”287 The general definition breaks down into three core 
elements: “consideration, chance, and a prize.”288 
 Consideration is determined by one of three theories: (1) 
valuable consideration theory, (2) contract consideration theory, or 
(3) promoter benefit theory.289 The most common theory in the 
United States is valuable consideration theory.290 Under this 
theory, a participant must give something of value to participate in 
a prize event.291 States that apply this theory in their gambling laws 
require that a game is pay-to-play and cannot have a free method 
of entering the event.292 Contract consideration theory requires a 
player to provide sufficient consideration to create a binding 
contract.293 This theory has the lowest threshold for finding 
consideration, as a mere change in position for a party is 
sufficient.294 Promoter benefit theory requires that a promoter (of 
an event or contest) receives a benefit of any kind to make a 
finding of consideration.295 
 A game of chance is determined to be gambling through 
one of three theories: (1) the Predominance test, (2) the Material 
Element test, or (3) the Gambling Instinct test.296 The 
Predominance test looks at chance and skill as a continuum and 
 
287 ROBERT W. STOCKER, ET AL, 1 GAMING LAW & PRACTICE § 2.02 (Matthew 
Bender ed., 2020 ed.). 
288 Id. 
289 Id. 
290 Id.  
291 Id. 
292 STOCKER, ET AL., supra note 287. 




2020  OPEN-WORLD REGULATION 125 
 
 
determines which characteristic dominates in a game or event.297 . 
The Material Element test determines that if chance plays any 
material role in a game or event, then the game or event is 
considered gambling.298 The Gambling Instinct test determines a 
game is gambling if a game or event appeals to someone’s 
gambling instinct.299 Games determined to be gambling usually 
have small amounts of consideration, long odds, and large 
prizes.300 In some jurisdictions, these common law tests are 
replaced with statutes that define gambling.301 The nature of loot 
boxes places them within the reach of these theories, as even 
representatives of the industry acknowledge the element of chance 
in loot boxes.302 
 Prizes are deemed present “when a participant can win 
something of marketable value in excess of the amount paid to 
enter.”303 A prize’s marketable value and transferability are 
important in determining digital objects as prizes.304 For example, 
some courts have defined additional lives in arcade consoles as not 
transferrable and therefore “not prizes for a gambling event 
analysis” even though the digital objects were considered 
marketable.305 Despite the arcade console promoter’s intention for 
 
297 STOCKER, ET AL., supra note 287. (The Predominance test consists of two 
paradigms: the “American Rule” and the “English Rule.” Determining whether 
to use either paradigm for the Predominance test depends on the jurisdiction. 
The “American Rule” uses the continuum to determine if a game or event is 
gambling. The “English Rule” requires that a game involve only “pure chance” 
to be considered gambling. An event or game that involves any amount of skill 
will not be considered gambling.) 
298 STOCKER, ET AL., supra note 287. 
299 Id. 
300 Id.  
301 Id.  
302 Cf. FED. TRADE COMM’N, INSIDE THE GAME: UNLOCKING THE CONSUMER 
ISSUES SURROUNDING LOOT BOXES 46-48 (2020). (Warneke is making a 
comparison of loot boxes to baseball cards, but the comparison requires a 
description where the player is taking a chance that they will get a certain 
reward. While there are a limited number of cards, the player is betting that the 
odds are in their favor of getting the card they want.) 
303 Id.  
304 Id. 
305 Id. 
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these digital objects not to have monetary value, the object’s 
marketability provided monetary value.306 Companies that make 
online casino games can avoid marketability issues by prohibiting 
the transfer of free plays or extra play credits between players or 
through other services.307  
Ultimately, these common law theories do not provide a 
definitive answer as to whether loot boxes can be regulated as 
gambling. The variation in scope among each theory308 gives the 
possibility that courts may be underinclusive when making a 
holding on the status of loot boxes. For example, the valuable 
consideration theory may not include loot boxes that are free309 but 
require grinding to win, which, in the case of Star Wars Battlefront 
II, was meant to incentivize players to choose the much easier 
method of paying for loot boxes.310 On the other hand, the 
promoter benefit theory could include these free loot boxes as 
consideration because the prizes give a competitive advantage in 
gameplay.311 Fulfilling the prize element leaves room for 
interpretation as courts make different interpretations of what 
defines market value and transferability.312 As seen with Counter 
Strike: Global Defensive, the developers may create their own 
valuations for items that players win, but the reality of third-party 
sites creates an issue over which party has a more accurate 
valuation of the item.313 If developers can argue that a player’s 
winnings have no value, then the theory on prizes cannot provide a 
remedy to regulate developers.314 Because common law theories 
 
306 Id; contra, Mason v. Mach. Zone, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 3d 457 (D. Md. 2015) 
(“But of course Plaintiff was not wagering with dollars; she was playing with 
virtual gold. Plaintiff acquired that "gold" in the "gold store," where she 
exchanged her real-world currency for a nontransferable, revocable license to 
use virtual currency for entertainment purposes.”). 
307 Id.  
308 Id. 
309 Id. 
310 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra, note 132, at 183.  
311 Id.; see Moshiarna, supra note 116. 
312 Id. 
313 See Taylor Stanton Hardenstein, Comment, "Skins" in the Game: Counter-
Strike, Esports, and the Shady World of Online Gambling, 7 UNLV GAMING 
L.J. 117, 121-22 (2017). 
314 See Mason v. Mach. Zone, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 3d 457 (D. Md. 2015) (“But of 
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on gambling may not give a conclusive answer to whether loot 
boxes are gambling, federal regulation is needed.  
 
B. Current Federal Statutes: The Unlawful Internet Gambling 
Enforcement Act 
 
 One way to understand how the federal government views 
video games and gambling is to examine the Unlawful Internet 
Gambling Enforcement Act (“UIGEA”), an Act addressing 
problems concerning the interstate nature of digital transactions in 
the Internet age.315 The UIGEA prohibits any person engaging “in 
the business of betting and wagering” from accepting financial 
instruments for unlawful internet gambling.316  
First, the terms “bet” and “wager” should be looked at to 
determine how the UIGEA defines gambling. The language in § 
5362 (1)(A) defines the terms “bet” or “wager” as: 
 
[T]he staking or risking by any person of something of 
value upon the outcome of a contest of others, a sporting 
event, or a game subject to chance, upon an agreement or 
understanding that the person or another person will receive 
something of value in the event of a certain outcome.317 
 
 Also, in the UIGEA definition of “bet” and “wager,” there is 
evidence that Congress adopted the Predominance test to define 
the terms.318 In § 5362(1)(B), a purchase of a chance or 
opportunity to win a prize is considered a “bet” or “wager” when 
chance is the predominant factor to winning.319 
Next, the UIGEA’s definition of “unlawful Internet gambling” 
 
course Plaintiff was not wagering with dollars; she was playing with virtual 
gold. Plaintiff acquired that "gold" in the "gold store," where she exchanged her 
real-world currency for a nontransferable, revocable license to use virtual 
currency for entertainment purposes.”). 




318 Id. § 5363(1)(B). 
319 Id. 
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provides an understanding of the contexts where an internet 
transmission is considered gambling. The UIGEA defines 
“unlawful Internet gambling” as: 
 
[T]o place, receive, or otherwise knowingly transmit a bet 
or wager by any means which involves the use, at least in 
part, of the Internet where such bet or wager is unlawful 
under any applicable Federal or State law in the State or 
Tribal lands in which the bet or wager is initiated, received, 
or otherwise made.320 
 
The UIGEA does not apply to intrastate gambling.321 It also 
does not apply to activity that would fit the definition of “unlawful 
Internet gambling” but is expressly authorized by the states where 
the transaction is initiated and received.322 
 The UIGEA provides the necessary definitions and 
verbiage for future regulations to control loot boxes as a form of 
gambling. “Bets” and “wagers” apply the Predominance test in § 
5363(1)(B), which is an appropriate theory to characterize the type 
of event that occurs with a loot box because the outcome of 
opening of a loot box is pure chance.323 Therefore, a loot box 
would provide a chance to win a prize under § 5363(1)(B).324 
 The UIGEA definition of “Unlawful Internet gambling” 
provides a template action for future regulations.325 All consoles 
have their own networks that use the internet to facilitate 
transactions between the player and the developer of the 
console.326 Because loot boxes provide players with a chance to 
win prizes, per the Predominance theory’s, purchasing loot boxes 
through these networks would be similar to transmitting a “bet” or 
“wager” under the definition of “unlawful Internet gambling.”327  
 
320 31 U.S.C. § 5363(10)(A). 
321 Id. § 5363(10)(B)(i) – (ii). 
322 Id. § 5363(1)(B)(ii) (2020). 
323 Id. § 5363(1)(B) (2020). 
324 Id.  
325 Id. § 5362(10)(A) (2020). 
326 XBOX, https://www.xbox.com/en-US/microsoft-store (Last visited Apr. 13, 
2020). 
327 Id. § 5363(10)(A). 
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 While the UIGEA provides language regarding gambling 
and its context with the internet and technology, the Act itself 
cannot regulate loot boxes. The UIEGA did not make internet 
gambling illegal,328 rather it made it illegal for banks to process 
transactions made by United States residents with unlawful 
gambling sites.329 Further, the UIGEA has lost much of its 
authority through court reversals and the Justice Department’s 




PART IV: MODEL LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 
 
Lastly, we come to our final option of federal regulation. As 
examined previously, the federal government has the authority 
under Murphy331 and Sebelius332 to regulate loot boxes. Federal 
law and regulation can create a direct solution to loot boxes 
whereas they might fall through the cracks of state common law on 
gambling333 and the UIGEA.334 On May 23, 2019, Senator Hawley 
introduced Senate Bill 1629 (“the Bill”) which was referred to the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.335 The Bill 
 
328 David J. Castillo, Note, Unpacking the Loot Box: How Gaming’s Latest 
Monetization System Flirts with Traditional Gambling Methods, 59 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 165, 181 (2019). See 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(A). 
329 Id.  
330 Id. at 179-82. (“The Wire Act, through the Federal Communications 
Commission's jurisdiction, empowers federal, state, and local law enforcement 
agents to "discontinue, or refuse, the leasing, furnishing, or maintaining of" 
facilities used for such purposes.  It did not, however, provide a definition for 
"bet or wager… The differing court interpretations of the Wire Act appear to be 
moot following the release of a memoranda by the Justice Department in 2011 
specifying that interstate transmissions unrelated to a "sporting event or contest" 
fall outside the Wire Act's reach. The effects of the Wire Act's limitation are 
seen through the explosion of internet gambling worldwide in the twenty-first 
century.”). 
331 Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476-77 (2018). 
332 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 536 (2012). 
333 STOCKER, ET AL., supra note 287. 
334 Castillo, supra note 328, at 181. 
335 S. 1629, 116th Cong. (2019). 
130 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 16:1 
  
provides a template for regulating the use of loot boxes in video 
games.336 First, the Bill defines terms such as  “add-on 
transaction,” “minor-oriented games,” “pay-to-win 
microtransaction,” and “loot box.”337 Second, the Bill tailors its 
prohibition to sales aimed toward minors.338 Lastly, while the Bill 
places the majority of regulatory authority with the FTC, the Bill 
also provides a carve-out for a state enforcement mechanism.339  
 The Bill’s terms and definitions in Section 2 provide broad 
regulatory targets for objects and entities.340 “Minor-Oriented 
Games” are defined as an “interactive digital entertainment 
product” for which the target audience is “individuals under the 
age of 18.”341 The Bill gives a non-exclusive list of characteristics 
in a game that can be evidence that the game is targeting 
individuals under the age of 18, including: subject matter of the 
product, visual content of the product, music and audio, use of 
animated characters that appeal to children, age of characters in a 
product, presence of celebrities under the age 18 or appeal to those 
under the age of 18, language in the product, content in 
advertising, empirical evidence of the audience, and other evidence 
demonstrating the target is underage.342 Regulations based off this 
standard should work alongside regulations to implement age 
algorithms, as mentioned earlier, and to disclose data from these 
algorithms.343  
Add-On Transaction is defined in the Bill as: 
 
[A] payment to the game publisher of an interactive digital 
entertainment product, an affiliate of the publisher, or any 
other person who accepts such payment for the benefit of 
the publisher, of either money or an in-game proxy for 
money, such as a virtual currency, that can be purchased 
 
336 Id. at § 1-3. 
337 Id. at § 2. 
338 Id. at § 1. 
339 Id. at § 3. 
340 Id. at § 2. 
341 S. 1629 § 2(5). 
342 Id. § 2(5)(A)-(K). 
343 DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, IMMERSIVE AND 
ADDICTIVE TECHNOLOGIES supra note 16 at 40. 
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with money, that-(i) unlocks a feature of the product; or 
(ii) adds to or enhances the entertainment value of the 
product.344 
 
The inclusion of virtual currency in the definition addresses the 
reality of in-game currency used as payment.345 In-game currencies 
can possibly protect distributors and publishers from claims that 
in-game currency has value based on transferability by placing in 
the Terms of Use agreement that in-game currency cannot be 
transferred.346 By leaving out any reference to transferability,347 the 
law can make liable all distributors and publishers who use a proxy 
for money in their games.348 
 “Pay-to-win microtransactions” are defined as a type of 
add-on transaction that, from the perspective of a reasonable user, 
the transaction would help ease progression, assist in 
accomplishing an achievement, assist in receiving a reward, or 
permit the user to continue to access content inaccessible due to a 
limit placed to stop the player from continuing.349 “Pay-to-win 
microtransactions” occur when, if only for the transaction, a user 
gets a competitive advantage in a game that a reasonable user 
would consider a competition with other users.350  
 The definition of “pay-to-win microtransactions” helps to 
address situations such as with Star Wars Battlefront II, where the 
developers made a system in which gaining experience provided a 
free option to gain abilities to use in the multiplayer battles, but it 
was nearly impossible to gain enough experience to get more cards 
and maintain a competitive advantage.351 Therefore, players had no 
 
344 S. 1629, 116th Cong. § 2(6)(A)(i)-(ii). 
345 Zendle, supra 14 at 183. 
346 Mason v. Mach. Zone, Inc., 851 F. 3d 320 (D. Md. 2015) (“But of course 
Plaintiff was not wagering with dollars; she was playing with virtual gold. 
Plaintiff acquired that "gold" in the "gold store," where she exchanged her real-
world currency for a nontransferable, revocable license to use virtual currency 
for entertainment purposes.”). 
347 See, S. 1629, 116th Cong. § 2(6)(A)(i)-(ii). 
348 Id. 
349 Id. § 2(7)(A)(i)(I)-(IV). 
350 Id. § 2(7)(A)(i). 
351 Moshirnia, supra note 116. 
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choice but to buy loot boxes in order to stay competitive.352 The 
Bill also differentiates between downloadable content where 
players know exactly what they’ll be getting, and add-on content 
that urges players to make a purchase for the possibility of getting 
a randomized reward.353  
 “Loot boxes” are defined as: 
 
[A]n add-on transaction to an interactive digital 
entertainment product that: (A) in a randomized or partially 
randomized fashion: (i) unlocks a feature of the product; or 
(ii) adds to or enhances the entertainment value of the 
product; or (B) allows the user to make 1 or more 
additional add-on transactions: (i) that the user could not 
have made without making the first add-on transaction; and 
(ii) the content of which is unknown to the user until after 
the user has made the first add-on transaction.354 
 
This definition of loot boxes is quite broad and encompasses all 
gambling mechanics. The Bill also forecloses the option to argue 
that skill represented a predominant factor in a game.355 The Bill’s 
focus on existence of chance in the interactive digital product,356 
rather than how much chance is involved in winning a prize,357 
broadens the universe of products that the Bill can regulate.358 
 The Bill’s primary function is in Section 1, which contains 
a prohibition against selling “pay-to-win microtransactions” and 
“loot boxes” in “minor-oriented” games or when the distributor or 
publisher “has constructive knowledge that any users are under age 
18.”359 Section 1(a)’s prohibition targeting “minor-oriented” games 
is useful for developing further legislation because it uses more 
factors for determining if a game is for minors and does not purely 
 
352 Id.  
353 S. 1629, 116th Cong. § 2(7)(B)(iii). 
354 S. 1629, 116th Cong. § 2(8). 
355 Id. § 2(8)(A); see also, STOCKER, ET AL., supra note 287. 
356 S. 1629, 116th Cong. § 2(8)(A). 
357 Stocker, supra note 287. 
358 Hong, supra note 35. (Some games utilize spinning wheels or other methods 
rather than present the play with a container holding randomized content). 
359 S. 1629, 116th Cong. § 1(a) – (b). 
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rely on the ESRB rating of a game to determine what elements 
make the game more oriented toward minors.360 Section 1(b)’s 
standard for constructive knowledge would probably work 
effectively with a statute that applies a duty of due care standard to 
developers. With this standard, developers would have the burden 
of proving that they did their best requisite research to make sure 
minors did not play a game with microtransactions or loot boxes. 
 Lastly, the enforcement mechanism provides a scheme that 
satisfies the anti-commandeering rule and the Commerce Clause. 
The Bill does not give rise to anti-commandeering issues as 
PASPA did in the Murphy case. Instead, the Bill gives State 
Attorneys General the option to bring a civil action claim against 
any person that violates the Act and bring them into an appropriate 
State court.361 Indeed, Section 3(b)(3)(A)-(C) specifically note that 
the statute is not to be construed to prevent the State Attorneys 
General from exercising their state powers to: (A) conduct 
investigations; (B) administer oaths or affirmation; or (C) compel 
the attendance of witnesses or the production of documentary and 
other evidence.362 Under this Bill, the only limits placed on a State 
would be that the State would need to give written notice and a 
copy of the complaint for the action to the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”)363 and to hold off during the pendency of 
FTC action against any named defendant.364 
 This enforcement mechanism also places authority in the 
correct agency. The FTC is instructed under 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)-
(2) to promulgate rules against unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
in or affecting commerce,365 while 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) empowers the 
FTC to file an action against a person: 
 
Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe 
that any such person, partnership, or corporation [uses] 
or [used] any unfair method of competition or unfair or 
 
360 Id. § 2(7)(B)(iii). 
361 Id. § 3(b)(1)(A). 
362 Id. § 3(b)(1)(B)(ii)(3). 
363 Id. § 3(b)(1)(B)(i)(I)-(II).  
364 S. 1629, 116th Cong. § 3(b)(5). 
365 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)-(2) (2020).  
134 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 16:1 
  
deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce, and 
if it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding 
by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the 
public, it shall issue and serve upon such person, 
partnership, or corporation a complaint stating its 
charges in that respect and containing a notice of a 
hearing upon a day and at a place therein fixed at least 
thirty days after the service of said complaint.366 
 
 Since this Bill regulates an interstate industry that engages in 
economic activity, the Commerce Clause grants Congress the 
authority to regulate it. As to the scope of the FTC’s authority, the 
Bill lists prohibited business activities, so violators would be 
engaging in an unfair business practice if they continued to sell 
loot boxes to minors, and enforcement would be under the FTC’s 
domain.367 
 Furthermore, the Bill treats the sale of loot boxes to minors 
as a civil infraction which may be more appropriate as a tool to 
disincentivize game developers than the current options, like 
individual civil actions brought directly by video game players.368  
 The civil infraction proposed in the Bill does not target the 
injury to the consumer, but rather the action of selling loot boxes to 
minors.369 The Bill is stopping developers from receiving any 
benefit that the company may receive from the sale at the time they 
sold it.370 Also, having the FTC file the claim shifts regulatory 
responsibility away from the consumer to the government as a 
regulator of these developers.371 
Senator Hawley’s proposed Bill would provide more 
predictability for developers and publishers to plan their businesses 
more accurately by understanding whom they can sell to. Also, the 
Bill requires companies have constructive knowledge only to 
 
366 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2018). 
367 Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 551. 
368 S. 1629 § 3(a)(3)(B)(ii). 
369 S. 1629 § 1(a) - (b). 
370 Id. at § 3 (b)(1)(A)(iii). 
371 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2018). 
2020  OPEN-WORLD REGULATION 135 
 
 
determine if a user is a minor.372 The Bill also sets out a clear 
adjudicatory feature, in requiring the FTC to provide hearings for 
defendants, where they are given the opportunity to show cause for 
why the FTC should not enter an order against them.373 During 
these hearings, developers can show that they have consumer 
research, programs for detecting age, 374 or other types of evidence 






The US federal government is capable of regulating loot boxes 
and should follow the example set out by European nations. 
Congress has authority to regulate the video game industry under 
the Commerce Clause. Direct regulation of loot boxes and pay-to-
win microtransactions to a specific class of consumers would be 
the most efficient method of enforcement, as seen in Senator 
Hawley’s Bill where it tailors regulation to sales of loot boxes to 
minors.  
The Bill allows businesses to obtain revenue through the sale 
of loot boxes and pay-to-win microtransactions to adults375 while 
still protecting children, a class of consumers that are particularly 
vulnerable and susceptible to maladaptive gambling behaviors.376 
 
372 S. 1629 § 1(b). 
373 15 USC § 45(b) (2018). 
374 DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, IMMERSIVE AND 
ADDICTIVE TECHNOLOGIES supra note 16 at 40. 
375 Eddie Makuch, EA Made Almost $1 Billion On Microtransactions Last 
Quarter, GAMESPOT, Feb. 3, 2020, https://www.gamespot.com/articles/ea-made-
almost-1-billion-on-microtransactions-last/1100-6473240/; See also FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, INSIDE THE GAME: UNLOCKING THE CONSUMER ISSUES SURROUNDING 
LOOT BOXES 60 (2020).  
376 Kevin Webb, Regulators from More Than a Dozen Countries Are Looking to 
Crack Down on 'Loot Boxes, ' A Controversial Video Gaming Practice that 
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The FTC workshop included a spectrum of opinion on varying 
levels of regulation that showed the balance of interests between 
business and consumers.377 Video game developers need revenue 
to create more games, however children and other vulnerable 
individuals need another level of protection in addition to self-
regulation. While society wants companies to innovate and create 
video games that expand the reaches of our imagination, regulators 
should work to further mold the relationship between businesses 
and consumers into one of mutual benefit, rather than one of 
detriment to one side.  
 Recent discussions and government actions regarding loot 
boxes are an indication of a growing concern for the potential for 
harm that technology can have on children. The relationship 
between behavior in children and loot boxes needs further study to 
determine if loot boxes cause any future maladaptive behaviors 
that can lead to gambling addiction. As technology advances and 
becomes more of a part of our daily lives, our growing interactions 
with it can normalize certain features which can have problematic 
consequences in the future. Thus, this is an area that should 






377 FED. TRADE COMM’N, INSIDE THE GAME: UNLOCKING THE CONSUMER ISSUES 
SURROUNDING LOOT BOXES 60 (2020).  
 
